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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
  
  Kenneth Thompson appeals pro se from the district court's order dismissing his 
complaint.  We will reverse the order and remand the cause to the district court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I. 
 On December 6, 1994, Robert Nami, Maurice Thompson, Bart Fernandez and Kenneth 
Thompson filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they were 
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment and denied access to the courts.   The 
plaintiffs were inmates housed in protective custody1 in the Administrative Close 
Supervision Unit (or "Unit") at the Wagner Youth Correctional Facility in Bordentown, New 
Jersey.  The defendants are: William Fauver, Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of 
Corrections; Joseph Butler, Wagner's Administrator; Willie Boggan, the Assistant 
Superintendent of the Unit; and Prem Sinha, the law librarian at Wagner.  The plaintiffs 
seek declaratory and injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages.  
 The defendants moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss on the grounds 
that: the complaint does not allege specific conduct by the defendants that has harmed the 
plaintiffs; the defendants cannot be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of respondeat 
superior; and the defendants are state officials who are being sued for damages in their 
official capacities and are therefore immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.  The 
district court found that to the extent the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, the 
defendants were not immune under the Eleventh Amendment, but agreed that the complaint 
failed to specify which defendants were responsible for the adoption and execution of the 
                     
1
 Protective custody inmates are those whose well-being might be imperilled were 
they to remain in the general population. 
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various policies and practices complained of.  Rather than allowing the plaintiffs to 
amend their complaint to correct that deficiency, the district court granted the motion to 
dismiss.   
II. 
  Because the district court's final order granted the defendants' motion to 
dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), our review is plenary.  We must 
determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the pleadings, the plaintiffs may be 
entitled to relief, and we must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint 
and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom.  Holder v. City of Allentown
987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993).  The complaint will be deemed to have alleged sufficient 
facts if it adequately put the defendants on notice of the essential elements of the 
plaintiffs' cause of action.  Since this is a § 1983 action, the plaintiffs are
to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the 
Constitution.  Id.  In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we do not inquire whether the 
plaintiffs will ultimately prevail, only whether they are entitled to offer evidence to 
support their claims.  Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).  The district court's 
order granting the defendants' motion to dismiss will be affirmed only if it appears that 
the plaintiffs could prove no set of facts that would entitle them to relief.  
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
III. 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
 The plaintiffs' claim of cruel and unusual punishment is based on the following 
allegations: 
 1. Inmates at the Unit are "double celled," housed two to a singl
foot cell with only one bed, so that one of them must sleep on the floor by the toilet.  
Cells have solid doors with only a four inch wide window for cell inspection, making it 
difficult to summon help.  Inmates often share cells with others who suffer from 
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psychiatric problems and/or who are violent felons, and non-smokers must often share with 
smokers. Floor space is minimal, effectively confining inmates to their beds.  Also, the 
ventilation system often shuts down for hours at a time.  Double celling has resulted in 
rapes and other assaults, as well as psychological stress.  Inmates who refuse to "double 
up" have been punished with periods of administrative segregation and loss of good time.
 2. Inmates must spend 24 hours a day in their cells except for out of cell 
recreation, visits and half-hour to one-hour job assignments. 
 3. Out of cell recreation is limited to one two-and-a-half hour period two days 
per week, in contrast to the seven day per week policy enjoyed by the general populatio
and protective custody inmates in other facilities.  Moreover, during outdoor recreation, 
inmates are denied bathroom access, resulting in unsanitary conditions in the exercise 
yard.  Those who cannot wait to use the bathroom inside risk punishment.   
 4. Access to drug and alcohol programs required by the parole board, and to jobs 
and educational programs, is more restricted for inmates in protective custody than for 
inmates in the general population.  General population inmates work at the Unit, even 
though a statute prohibits inmates not under protective custody from entering the 
protective custody area. 
 5. When transported to other locations -- for example, to visit the doctor 
inmates must wear a painful device, the "black box," which is so uncomfortable that 
inmates are deterred from seeking medical or dental help; general population inmates 
apparently do not have to wear this device, nor do inmates in protective custody at other 
facilities.   
 6. One of the plaintiffs, Kenneth Thompson, alleges that his requests to see a 
dentist and an eye doctor have been ignored.  
 Rather than examining the plaintiffs' allegations concerning the conditions of 
their confinement as a whole, the district court split these allegations into three 
categories. First, the court analyzed the double celling allegations, inferred from 
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v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981), that double celling is not per se a constitutional 
violation, and concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim in that regard. 
Second, the court addressed the allegation that there have been increased rapes and other 
assaults, finding that the claim based upon these allegations lacked merit because the 
plaintiffs failed to show "deliberate indifference," citing Young v. Quinlan
351, 360 n.22 (3d Cir. 1992).  Finally, the court treated the remaining Eighth Amendment 
allegations as amounting to an equal protection claim, based on a comparison of the 
plaintiffs' treatment with that of the general population of the prison.  It found this 
claim to likewise be without merit. 
 We conclude that the district court erred.  While Rhodes may stand for the 
proposition that double celling does not per se amount to an Eighth Amendment violation, 
it does not stand for the proposition that double celling can never amount to an Eighth 
Amendment violation.  The Supreme Court held only that, under the circumstances of that 
particular case, the double celling in question did not violate the plaintiffs' Eighth 
Amendment rights.  The Court noted that  
No static `test' can exist by which courts can determine whether 
conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for the Eighth 
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society. 
Id. at 346 (citation and internal quotations omitted).  The court went on to state that: 
conditions must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of 
pain, nor may they be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the 
crime warranting imprisonment. . . . [Conditions may constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment if] they result[] in unquestioned and serious 
deprivations of basic human needs . . . , [which] deprive inmates of 
the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities . . . . 
Id. at 347.   
 In other words, it is implicit in Rhodes that double celling can amount to an 
Eighth Amendment violation if combined with other adverse conditions.  Thus, in 
Owens, 907 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1990), we noted that, to determine whether conditions of 
confinement violate the Eighth Amendment, it is necessary to examine the totality of the 
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conditions at the institution, and we held that double celling at SCI Pittsburgh violated 
the Eighth Amendment because of those conditions.  Id. at 426-427.  Relevant 
considerations include the length of confinement, the amount of time prisoners must spend 
in their cells each day, sanitation, lighting, bedding, ventilation, noise, education and 
rehabilitation programs, opportunities for activities outside the cells, and the repair 
and functioning of basic physical facilities such as plumbing, ventilation, and showers.  
Id. at 427.  Here, the allegations in the complaint raise another significant 
consideration; that plaintiffs were subject to sexual assaults, and that the defendants, 
by failing to protect plaintiffs adequately, were deliberately indifferent to the 
potential for this type of harm.  If proven, these allegations, irrespective of whether 
the harm resulted from double celling or other conditions of the confinement, could 
establish deliberate indifference as contemplated by Rhodes v. Chapman. 
 As in Rhodes, courts finding double celling permissible have emphasized that 
general prison conditions were otherwise adequate.  Id.  We stress that the conditions in 
Rhodes were different in many ways from those in the case before us (and considerably 
different from the grim conditions related in Tillery).  The cells in Rhodes
Nonetheless, cells housing two inmates had two-tiered bunk beds, each cell had heating and 
air circulation vents and a built-in radio, one wall consisted only of bars, and between 
6:30 a.m. and 9:30 p.m. inmates had access to "dayrooms" (designed to be counterparts of a 
living room at home, each included a television, card tables and chairs). 
 The district court failed to analyze the relevant consideration listed above.  
Nor did the court discuss double celling in the overall context of prison conditions.  To 
that extent the district court erred.2  Although the complaint alleged that the increase 
in rapes and other assaults was a result of double celling, the district court treated 
                     
2
 Since under Tillery the plaintiffs' other Eighth Amendment claims are 
unavoidably part of the analysis of the double celling issue, we need not address them 
separately in detail here. 
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this allegation separately.  The court found that the plaintiffs did not state a claim 
because they had failed "to indicate any conduct by the defendants which could amount to 
`deliberate indifference.'" (Dist. Ct. at 9, citing Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 360 
n.22 (3d Cir. 1992)).  Here, the court also erred. 
 In Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991), the Supreme Court held that to 
establish an Eighth Amendment violation an inmate must allege both an objective element 
that the deprivation was sufficiently serious -- and a subjective element --
official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e., deliberate indifference.
 It cannot be wholly determined from the record whether in this case prison 
officials actually displayed deliberate indifference.  Nonetheless, this complaint 
actually states that "letters have been written to the [administration] concerning all 
matters set forth in the complaint.  All requests for administrative remedies were 
refused."  (Complaint at 3.)  This suggests that the defendants here were on actual notice 
by plaintiffs' reports of rape, violence and the other conditions alleged in their 
complaint.  Although, by itself, such notice may not equal proof of deliberate 
indifference, it nevertheless directly contradicts the district court's tacit conclusion, 
which has no support in the record, that plaintiffs could prove no set of facts that would 
either show deliberate indifference or otherwise entitle them to relief. 
 Finally, the district court erred in its consideration of the plaintiffs' 
remaining Eighth Amendment allegations.  The court stated that 
there is no support for the assertion that plaintiffs' constitutional 
rights are being violated by denying them the same `rights and 
privileges' afforded to inmates in the general population and this 
Court defers to the judgment of the prison officials in adopting and 
executing policies and practices that they believe, in their 
discretion, are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain 
institutional security. 
 
(Dist. Ct. at 9-10.)  That may be true (although, since the defendants did not have an 
opportunity to explain the justifications for these "policies and practices," the court
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assumption that they are legitimate is perhaps premature); however, the plaintiffs appear 
to have raised these allegations as part of their Eighth Amendment claim, not merely as an 
equal protection claim.  For example, the plaintiffs complain about use of "black boxes," 
not simply because general population prisoners are not subjected to them, but because 
they are so uncomfortable that they deter inmates from seeking medical and dental help. 
For the reasons stated above, these remaining allegations should have been considered 
along with the issue of double celling, and should at least have been considered as part 
of the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims. 
 Thus, with regard to the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims, we conclude that 
the district court erred.  Based upon the record before us, we cannot say that the 
plaintiffs would be unable to prove that prison conditions were objectively unacceptable, 
and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to plaintiffs' plight.  We note 
that the district court entertained, but rejected (Dist. Ct. at 5), the possibility that 
plaintiffs may be able to satisfy some deficiencies in their original pleading by filing 
an amended complaint.  Plaintiffs may be able to allege in an amended complaint, for 
example, sufficient facts to support a finding that some defendants displayed deliberate 
indifference to certain harms, or that all officials were deliberately indifferent to the 
possibility that the conditions under which they housed the plaintiffs significantly 
increased the possibility of such well-known harms as prison rape. 
IV. 
Access to the Courts 
 The plaintiffs' denial of access to the courts claim is based on the following 
allegations.  Protective custody inmates are denied access to paralegals or other pe
trained in law who could assist them with drafting legal papers.  Paralegals are only 
available to protective custody inmates facing disciplinary charges, while defendant Sinha 
refuses to help protective custody inmates prepare habeas corpus petitions or civil 
complaints. Moreover, Sinha has attempted to frustrate the plaintiffs in this case by 
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delaying return of documents and failing to make copies of legal documents.  Protective 
custody inmates are effectively prevented from helping each other by a policy prohibiting 
them from talking to each other through the doors and passing items to between cells; 
those who violate that policy risk disciplinary action.  In addition, prisoners are faced 
with a Catch 22-style problem: in order to obtain access to legal materials, inmates must 
submit written requests for specific materials; however, they cannot effectively do so 
because they lack access to the very legal materials that would advise them which 
materials to request.  The plaintiffs also allege that everyone who has attempted to bring 
a civil complaint to attack these procedures has been transferred.   
 As we stated in Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 204 (3d Cir. 1993), the 
standard in resolving a claim of denial of access to the courts is  
 
whether the mix of paralegal services, copying services and available 
research materials can provide sufficient information so that a 
prisoner's claims or defenses can be reasonably and adequately 
presented. 
As with claims involving double celling, in addressing a claim of denial of access to the 
courts "each legal resource package must be evaluated as a whole on a case-
Id. at 203.   
 However, just as the district court failed to address the plaintiffs' double 
celling claims as a whole, in addressing their claim of denial of access to the courts the 
district court only analyzed one allegation, denial of access to paralegals. Moreover, the 
court addressed it by relying on defendant Boggan's affidavit in an unrelated case in 
which he states that paralegals are available on written request to help inmates with any 
legal problem or lawsuit.  Because the plaintiffs did not allege that they had submitted 
written requests, the district court held that they had failed to state a claim of denial 
of access to the courts.   
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 The district court erred here as well.  In choosing to believe Boggan's 
affidavit, the court failed to take the allegations in the complaint as true 
in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).  In addition, the court
address the remaining allegations at all.  Since the plaintiffs' allegations are not self
evidently false, and since their allegations do not facially indicate that the plaintiffs 
could not state a claim, the district court erred by granting the defendants' motion to 
dismiss. 
V. 
 In conclusion, the district court should not have granted the defendants' motion 
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). We will reverse the judgment of the district court and 
remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
